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I. INTRODUCTION
At 6:40 a.m. on August 30, 2000, in the underground parking lot of New York
City's Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, seventy-two-year-old Li Peng, the Chairman of
China's People's Congress, was served with a civil summons to appear in Federal
Court in New York to explain his role in the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre.'
The suit charges that Mr. Li, who was Prime Minister of China during the 1989
massacre, was responsible for crimes against humanity, including summary
execution, arbitrary detention, and torture. The five plaintiffs in the suit are all
victims of the Chinese army's attack in the chaotic early morning hours of June 4,
1989, including Zhang Liming, a San Diego cook whose twenty-one-year-old sister
was shot dead by Chinese troops.3 "I'm looking for redress," Zhang said. "In the
name of justice, we will seek all legal remedies and vow to obtain accountability for
the June 4th massacre.",
4
What is happening here? How did Chinese citizens who had no contact with the
United States, bring suit in a U.S. federal court for events that occurred in China?
As Zhang Liming said, the plaintiffs pursued all possible legal remedies and then
1. See Edward Wong, Chinese Leader Sued in New York Over Deaths Stemming From Tiananmen
Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2000, at A6 (indicating that an employee of the U.S. State Department aided the
process server in serving Li). Judge Richard Casey ruled the previous week that a federal employee guarding Li
could accept the summons because it was too difficult to reach Li. See id. The Tiananmen Square Massacre began
on June 3,1989, when the People's Liberation Army and the People's Armed Police used semi-automatic weapons
and armored cars to clear Beijing's streets of student demonstrators and civilians who were demanding their
constitutional rights to freedom of expression and assembly, political reform, and an end to widespread corruption.
See Former Chinese Premier Ordered to Appear in U.S. Federal Court (Sept. 23, 2000), at http://www.cnn.
com12000/ASIANOW/eastlO9/23/china.lipenglindex.html (on file with The TransnationalLawyer). There has never
been a full accounting of the Tiananmen incident, and an exact number of those killed has never been made
available, but it is estimated to be in the thousands. See id.
2. See Wong, supra note 1, at A6 (noting that the lawsuit alleges that Li gave the order for the crackdown
on student demonstrators and that he should have sought to halt the egregious abuses of human rights committed
by the troops).
3. See id.; see also Former Chinese Premier Ordered to Appear in U.S. Federal Court, supra note I
(naming the four other plaintiffs, Zhou Suo Fen, Liu Gang, Ziong Yan, and Wang Dan, who had all been on China's
"Most-Wanted List" of2l student leaders following the Tiananmen Square Massacre). The students were detained
without a fair trial, held without any charges lodged against them, subjected to electric shock, and had no contact
with their families. Id.
4. Patricia Hurtado, Survivors: Justice For 7iananmen/Court Damages Sought For Rights Abuse,
NEWSDAY, Sept. 1, 2000, at A3.
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discovered a law enacted in 1789, the Alien Tort Statute.5 The Alien Tort Statute
provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the Law of Nations or a treaty of
the United States."6
However simple the language of the Statute may seem, succeeding in an Alien
Tort claim is easier said than done. Numerous questions arise when seeking redress
under the Alien Tort Statute. What exactly does the "Law of Nations" consist of?
Did the framers intend to include human rights violations? How can a plaintiff
circumvent the act of state doctrine, separation of powers, and the political question
doctrine barriers? How does the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act7 affect the Alien
Tort Statute? Are these suits a proper utilization of the Federal Court system and
American tax dollars? Even if a plaintiff overcomes these challenges, is it possible
to recover damages from a defendant, especially since no Alien Tort Statute lawsuit
has ever produced payment to an injured plaintiff?8
This Comment discusses the Alien Tort Statute and its applicability to modem
human rights cases. Part II of this Comment addresses the background and historical
development of the Alien Tort Statute. Part Ill focuses on the seminal human rights
case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala9 and other recent cases to clarify where the law
currently stands. Part IV examines the difficulties in establishing a successful
lawsuit under the Statute by examining such hurdles as the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, the act of state doctrine, and the political question doctrine, while
trying to understand the original intent of the Statute. The Comment also discusses
the Torture Victim Protection Act1o passed in 1992, which sheds some light on
Congress' intent for the ambiguous Alien Tort Statute. However, the practical effect
of the Torture Victim Protection Act conflicts with the Alien Tort Statute, raising
even more questions about the original intent of the Alien Tort Statute.
Part V of this Comment analyzes the current case against Li Peng in light of all
of the relevant statutes and cases and concludes it is unlikely that the plaintiffs will
succeed in their quest for justice in the Tiananmen Square Massacre. Finally, Part
VI concludes that the Alien Tort Statute is not the correct avenue to redress human
rights abuses because of the numerous roadblocks that cannot be overcome to secure
a judgment. The novel use of the law is clearly inconsistent with the intent of the
drafters of the Alien Tort Statute. The Statute was originally designed to provide
relief for foreigners against sea pirates and slavers," not to allow individuals to file
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993).
6. Id.
7. 28 U.S.C §§ 1602-1611 (1994).
8. See Wong, supra note 1, at A6 (describing the dozens of lawsuits filed which resulted in favorable
rulings for the plaintiffs, but have failed to pay any damages).
9. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
10. 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1993); see infra notes 192-210 and accompanying text.
11. See Go Global, Sue Local, THE EcONOMIsT, Aug. 14, 1999; se also infra, note 41 and accompanying
text (describing the two early cases and how they were used to determine admiralty jurisdiction).
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million dollar lawsuits against foreign dictators. If the United States wishes to be a
forum for international law and human rights, it must do so clearly and
unambiguously, not with a two-hundred year old law that has little application in the
21 st Century.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
A. The Alien Tort Statute Described
The first U.S. Congress enacted the Alien Tort Statute on September 24, 1789,
as part of the Federal Judiciary Act.' 2 By enacting the Statute, Congress intended to
provide extraterritorial jurisdiction over the crimes of piracy, slave trading,
violations of safe conduct, and the kidnapping of ambassadors.' 3 By its terms, a suit
brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1350 requires three elements: (1) a civil suit for tort only,
(2) brought by an alien plaintiff, ahd (3) committed in violation of either the Law
of Nations or a treaty of the United States. 14 Due to a lack of congressional record,
the actual meaning of the Statute's language and the intent of its principal drafter,
former U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth, is difficult to
determine. 5 Legal scholars have attempted to uncover the values and philosophies
that inspired the drafters of the Statute. 16 Both the ideological climate at the time of
the drafting of the Statute and what the "Law of Nations" meant to the drafters is of
particular importance.
B. Constitutional Origins and Judicial History
In 1975, Judge Henry Friendly described the Alien Tort Statute as a "legal
Lohengrin; although it has been with us since the first Judiciary Act ... no one
seems to know whence it came." 17 To be sure, trying to formulate an explicit
12. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73,77 (1789); see generally Charles Warren, New Light
on the History ofthe FederalJudiciaryAct of1789,37 HARV. L. REv. 49 (1923) (studying the chronological events
of the First Judiciary Act in depth).
13. See Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Human Rights
Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'LL.J. 53,61 n.42 (1981) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 1651 (1970), a congressional statute prohibiting piracy under Law of Nations).
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988).
15. See William R. Casto, Federal Courts Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of the
Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467,495 (1986).
16. See generally Erwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States,
101 U. PA. L. REv. 26 (1952) (discussing the 18th century political and philosophical climate extensively).
17. lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
Lohengrin was the mysterious champion of Elsa von Brabant, a fair maid falsely accused of her brother's
murder, through the machinations of the wicked sorceress Ortrud. Elsa asserted her innocence before
King Henry I of Germany, who decided to try the case by judicial combat between Ortrud's ambitious
husband Frederick and any champion Elsa could summon. Suddenly a knight appeared, ascending the
river Scheldt in a boat drawn by a swan. The knight agreed to champion Elsa, who in turn promised to
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definition of the Law of Nations is a difficult task for U.S. courts.'8 Britain adopted
the Law of Nations and brought it to America as part of our colonial legal heritage.' 9
During the eighteenth century, Britain viewed the Law of Nations as a "universal
law binding upon all mankind"20 and considered it to be part of British common
law.2' Even before the drafting of the U.S. Constitution, the Law of Nations formed
part of the Anglo-American legal tradition.22 William Blackstone commented in
1769 that the responsibilities arising under the Law of Nations were "ancient and
time-honored axioms that bound all civilized people."23 Blackstone described the
Law of Nations as "a system of rules, deducible by natural reason, and established
by universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the world. 24
The framers of the Constitution, most of whom were lawyers,25 recognized this
responsibility and perceived the Law of Nations as part of the common law.26
Delegates to the Constitutional Convention expressed their desire to form a national
government with paramount authority in regard to the Law of Nations and treaty
obligations.27 The authors of the Federalist papers agreed, emphasizing the need for
a single national voice in foreign relations.28 Without a single national voice,
Alexander Hamilton observed that "the union will undoubtedly be answerable to
foreign powers for the conduct of its members. And the responsibility for an injury
marry him, and never ask him of his origin or name. Naturally, Frederick was defeated. Elsa's innocence
thus proven, preparations for the wedding were made. However, on the wedding night, she broke her
promise to her husband and inquired into his identity. He tried to calm her suspicions, but the harm had
already been done. The next morning before the King, the stranger revealed himself as Lohengrin, son
of Percival, keeper of the Holy Grail. Now that his name was known, Lohengrin had to leave Brabant
and his fair Elsa forever. The swan reappeared and Lohengrin took final leave of his bride, who then
died, apparently of a broken heart.
Jay M. Lewis Humphrey, Comment, A Legal Lohengrin: Federal Jurisdiction Under the Alien Tort Claims Act of
1789, 14 U.S.F. L. REv. 105 (1979) (citing R. WAGNER, Lohengrin, The Authentic Librettos of the Wagner Operas
68 (1938)).
18. See generally United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 159 (1820). Justice Story, writing for the
Court, noted that an explicit definition of the Law of Nations was almost impossible because "[o]ffences, too,
against the law of nations, cannot, with any accuracy, be said to be completely ascertained and defined in any public
code recognised by the common consent of nations." Id.; see also The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670
(1865) (quoting Justice Story as saying that "[t]he law of nations is also called the law of nature; it is founded on
the common consent as well as the common sense of the world").
19. See Dickinson, supra note 16, at 26.
20. Id. at 27.
21. See Triquet v. Bath, 97 Eng. Rep. 936 (K.B. 1764) (opinion by Lord Mansfield).
22. See Dickinson, supra note 16, at 26.
23. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 67 (1769).
24. Id. at 66.
25. See Dickinson, supra note 16, at 35, n.27 (noting that of the 55 people who attended the Constitutional
Convention, 33 had been lawyers and of those, 10 had been judges).
26. See id. at 34-35 (stating that there was consensus among the men of learning in the 18th century that the
Law of Nations was incorporated into the domestic common law). "It was axiomatic among the men of learning that
the Law of Nations, applicable to individuals and to states, was an integral part of the law which they administered
or practiced." Id. at 35.
27. Humphrey, supra note 17, at 114.
28. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 3 (John Jay).
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ought ever to be accompanied with the faculty of preventing it.',29 James Madison
voiced his concern that the courts must be able to "prevent those violations of the
law of nations and of treaties which if not prevented must involve us in the
calamities of foreign wars. 3 °
One particular incident gave rise to a sense of urgency among the delegates to
the Constitutional Convention to avoid a possible involvement in a foreign war and
any further embarrassment to a young United States.3' On May 19, 1784, on a street
in Philadelphia, Chevalier De Longchamps a French citizen of "obscure and
worthless character,"32 assaulted French Consul General Francis Barbe Marbois two
days after threatening Marbois at a gathering in the French Ambassador's home.33
The case drew so much attention that the Continental Congress offered a bounty to
anyone who could capture De Longchamps so that he "may be brought to justice for
his said violations of the Laws of Nations and of the land. 34
Members of the Continental Congress and other prominent statesmen discussed
the Marbois affair in various letters.35 However, the Continental Congress, without
its own authority, had no power to try De Longchamps, and could only urge the
states to do so. 36 The international community was outraged and demanded that the
Congress take action, but the Congress was powerless to deal with the matter and
could do nothing more than offer a reward for the apprehension of De
Longchamps.37
Ultimately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court tried and convicted De
Longchamps for "a crime against the law of nations," which the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held to be part of Pennsylvania's common law. 38 In the wake of the
Marbois affair, the Continental Congress recommended that all states pass similar
29. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton),
30. See Casto, supra note 15, at 494; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton). Because
external affairs issues could lead to war, the delegates believed that "[sio great a proportion of the controversies in
which foreigners are parties, involve national questions, that it is by far most safe and most expedient to refer all
those in which they are concerned to the national tribunals." Id.
31. See Villiam S. Dodge, The Historical Origins oftheAlien Tort Statute:A Responsetothe "Originalists'
19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 221,229 (1996).
32. Casto, supra note 15, at 491.
33. Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (1784); see also Dodge, supra note 31, at 229
(describing the events surrounding the De Longchamps assault and battery).
34. Dodge, supra note 31, at 229.
35. See Casto, supra note 15, at 492 n.142 (indicating that Professor Casto has found frequent discussion
of the Marbois affair in the letters of prominent statesmen, including George Washington, Benjamin Franklin,
Thomas Jefferson, and John Jay).
36. See Dodge, supra note 31, at 230 (explaining that the powers of the Continental Congress were limited
by the nature of a federal union in which each state retains a distinct and absolute sovereignty in matters not
expressly delegated to the Congress).
37. See Casto, supra note 15, at 491-92 n.138 (stating that the French minister formally complained to the
Congress, and the ambassador from the Netherlands, Mr. Van Berkel, threatened to leave the state unless action was
taken).
38. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (I Dall.) at 116.
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laws, and even directed John Jay, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, to draft a model
statute for the states to adopt.
39
The birth of the cryptic Alien Tort Statute followed shortly thereafter in the
Judiciary Act of 1789.' 0 With the exception of two admiralty jurisdiction cases, the
Statute was quickly forgotten for over a century.4 Since its enactment, the Alien
Tort Statute has undergone some language changes, but these changes have not
given further guidance on the meaning of the Law of Nations. 2
The Supreme Court applies international law, often described as the Law of
Nations. As Chief Justice John Marshall pronounced in 1815, "the Court is bound
39. See Dodge, supra note 31, at 230 (describing the recommendation to John Jay that he draft "an act to
be recommended to the legislatures of the respective states, for punishing the infractions of the laws of nations, and
more especially for securing the privileges and immunities of public Ministers from foreign powers ..."); cf. Casto,
supra note 15, at 493 n.144 (indicating that The John Jay Project at Columbia University has no record that Jay
drafted any proposed legislation).
40. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), I Stat. 73,77 (1789).
41. See Casto, supra note 15, at 468. The first case to interpret the Alien Tort Statute was Moxon v. The
Brigantine Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895). In 1793, the French schooner Sans Culottes captured
the British Brigantine Fanny in U.S. waters as a prize and brought it into the port of Philadelphia. See id. At the
time, France was at war with Britain, and the United States was neutral. See id. at 943. The owners of the Fanny
alleged marine trespass and sued to recover the ship, the cargo, and the damages for their detention. See id. The
plaintiffs asserted both admiralty jurisdiction and jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute, contending that the
capture was a tort only in violation of the Law of Nations. See id. The Moxon court avoided jurisdiction by narrowly
construing the phrase "tort only," holding that a suit for marine trespass was entirely a suit for damages and did not
involve a plea for specific restitution of the property itself. See id. at 948.
In 1795, Moxon was contradicted in Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795). A Spanish subject
mortgaged slaves to a British subject who placed "mortgaged property" aboard a Spanish ship. See id. Captain
Bolchos, a French privateer, captured the Spanish vessel as a prize and brought it into port in South Carolina. See
id. An agent of the British mortgagee, Edward Darrel, seized and sold the slaves. See id. Bolchos sued the agent for
restitution, saying that all neutral property aboard the prize belonged to the captor under provisions of a treaty
between the United States and France. See id. The court ignored Moxon, permitting a claim for restitution and
ordering the property or money arising from the sale returned. See id. at 811; see also Humphrey, supra note 17,
at 116-17.
42. See Casto, supra note 15, at 468 n.4.
As originally enacted, the Alien Tort Statute provided that the district courts "shall also have cognizance,
concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes
where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." In
the 1878 revision and codification of federal statutes, the Act was changed to provide that "the district
courts shall have jurisdiction... [o]f all suits brought by any alien for a tort only in violation of the law
of nations, or of a treaty of the United States." The deletion of the reference to the state courts'
concurrent jurisdiction should not be read as making the district court's jurisdiction exclusive, because
the plan of the Revised Statutes was to enact a single section consolidating all instances of exclusive
federaljurisdiction. In 1911, the Act was reenacted in the following terms, "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction ... [o]f all suits brought by any alien for a tort only, in violation of the law of
nations or of a treaty of the United States." The 1911 codification continued the consolidation of all
instances of exclusive federal jurisdiction in one section. The current language was enacted as part of
the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code. The words "civil action" were substituted for "suits" in view of
Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The 1948 revision repealed the former section listing all
instances of exclusive jurisdiction, and instead made express provisions for exclusivejurisdiction in the
individual sections vesting the federal courts with jurisdiction.
Id. (citations omitted).
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by the law of nations which is part of the law of the land.' 43 Marshall stated in
another case that same year that "[t]he law of nations is the great source from which
we derive those rules, respecting belligerent and neutral rights, which are recognized
by all civilized and commercial states." 44 Eighty-five years later, the Supreme Court
again stated through Justice Grey that "[i]nternational law is part of our law."45
Justice Grey gave a guideline for determining the Law of Nations, stating "[t]he Law
of Nations may be ascertained by consulting the customs and usages of civilized
nations as well as works by learned jurists and commentators., 46 The Court also
indicated the Law of Nations evolved through "[a]n ancient usage among civilized
nations, beginning centuries ago, and gradually ripening into a rule of international
law."47 The Law of Nations is certainly not an easy concept to grasp, as many courts
and commentators have determined; however, it seems clear that it encompasses
customary international law.
III. FILARTGA GIvEs THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE NEW LIFE
A. The Filartiga Case
On March 29, 1976, Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, then Inspector-General of
Police in Asuncion, Paraguay, allegedly tortured and murdered Joelito Filartiga, the
son of Dr. Joel Filartiga.48 Dr. Filartiga was a physician whose grass-roots assistance
to Paraguay's rural population made him a political opponent of the dictatorship of
General Alfredo Stroessner.49 Pena-Irala and three other police agents arrested
Joelito Filartiga and tortured him in a ninety-minute, tape-recorded interrogation
session.50 Filartiga died of cardiac arrest from repeated electric shock treatment, and
Pena-Irala devised an elaborate scheme to escape responsibility for Filartiga's
43. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815).
44. Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815).
45. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 686.
48. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
49. See id.; see also Jean-Marie Simon, The Alien Tort Claims Act: Justice Or Show Trials?, I 1 B.U. INT'L
L.J. I n.83 (1993) (indicating that Stroessner was President since 1954, and repeatedly suspended the Paraguayan
Constitution on the pretext of an ongoing state of emergency).
50. See Richard P. Claude, The Case ofJoelito Filartiga and the Clinic ofHope, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 275,284-85
(Aug. 1983) (indicating that Pena and the other officers tortured Joelito to find out about his father's humanitarian
work within the country in order to convict Dr. Filartiga of sedition). However, the officers obtained no evidence
against Dr. Filartiga. Instead, the recording only contained Joelito's voice pleading, "I do not know anything. Why
are you doing this to me?" Id. The electric shocks were of such frequency and intensity that Joelito unexpectedly
died. Id. Pena-Irala and the otherpolice panicked and attempted to disguise their actions by severing Joelito's major
arteries so the body could not be embalmed and thus would require a quick burial. Id.; see also Filartiga, 630 F.2d
at 878 (stating that when Pena-Irala and the police brought Dolly Filartiga to Pena-Irala's home to show her the
body of her brother, she fled horrified, with Pena-Irala shouting, "Here you have what you have been looking for
for so long and what you deserve. Now shut up").
214
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 14
death.5' Despite Pena-Irala's alleged admission of the crime to Filartiga's sister and
the numerous photos of Filartiga's tortured body showing "professional methods of
torture,,52 the Paraguayan courts denied the family's request to file a lawsuit.
53
Police arrested, caged, and shackled the Filartiga family's lawyer, threatening him
with death simply for attempting to summon the participating police officers.5 4 The
attorney was then allegedly disbarred without cause.55
In July 1978, Pena-Irala traveled to Brooklyn, New York. 6 When his tourist
visa expired, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), acting on a tip from
exiled Paraguayans and human rights groups, arrested Pena-Irala and charged him
with overstaying his visa. Subsequently, the INS ordered him deported following a
hearing on April 5, 1979.57 Almost immediately, Filartiga's sister, Dolly Filartiga,
caused Pena-Irala to be served with a summons and civil complaint at the Brooklyn
Navy Yard, where he was being held pending deportation.58 The complaint alleged
that Pena-Irala wrongfully caused Filartiga's death by torture in violation of the
Allen Tort Statute and sought compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of
ten million dollars. In addition, the complaint requested that the court enjoin the
deportation of Pena-Irala in order to ensure his availability for testimony at trial.
59
However, in an unreported decision, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of New York dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.60 Further, the
court refused to recognize torture as a violation of the Law of Nations.6' After the
court denied two additional requests for a stay of deportation, the INS released Pena-
Irala and he immediately returned to Paraguay.62
51. See Claude, supra note 50, at284 (stating that at the time in Paraguay, the law excused from punishment
"crimes of passion" committed by a husband that kills another who is caught having an affair with his wife). Pena-
Irala planned to escape the killing of Joelito under the "crime of passion" exception. Id. In order to do this, the
policemen with Pena-Irala transported Joelito's tortured corpse to Pena-Irala's own house. Id. The corpse was placed
in Pena-Irala's mistress's 17 year-old daughter's bed. Id. Pena-Irala then contacted his mistress's husband, Hugo
Duarte, who was at work, and ordered him to come home. Id. Once Duarte arrived, Pena-Irala and the other officers
beat him until he agreed to fabricate a story in which he came home to find Joelito in bed with his wife, and then
murdered him. Id.
52. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878 (indicating that three independent autopsies demonstrated that Joelito
Filartiga's death was "the result of professional methods of torture").
53. See Simon, supra note 49, at 17; see also Claude, supra note 50, at 284-85 (stating that the judge who
denied the request to file suit was the same judge who arrived at the Pena-Irala house, where the body of Joelito was
planted, to legalize the falsified death certificate).
54. See Fiartniga, 630 F.2d at 878. In addition to threats to the attorney, the Filartiga family and friends were
verbally threatened and harassed, and Dr. Filartiga was threatened with loss of his medical license if he proceeded
with an attempt at a lawsuit. See Claude, supra note 50, at 285.
55. See Filartiga, 630 E2d at 878.
56. Id. at 878-79.
57. See Simon, supra note 49 at 17; see also Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 879.
58. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 879.
59. See id.
60. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
61. See Claude, supra note 50, at 288.
62. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
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On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Chief Judge
Kaufman, unanimously ruled that officially sanctioned torture violated the Law of
Nations and that the Alien Tort Statute covered the act of torture.63 Furthermore, the
court held that the right to be free from torture was part of evolving customary
international law.64 On remand, the district court entered a default judgment for the
Filartiga family, and in 1983, the Magistrate recommended a damage award of five
million dollars to each of the two plaintiffs.65
B. The Significance of Filartiga
Filartiga set legal precedent in several respects.66 First, the court held that the
Law of Nations included the violation of human rights, specifically torture.67
Second, the holding in Filartiga also recognized that the Alien Tort Statute could
serve as a vehicle for adjudicating human rights violations.68 The court further held
that torture by a state actor violated customary international law and thus violated
the Law of Nations.69 The Law of Nations is part of U.S. federal law and because
Congress explicitly provided implementing legislation through 28 U.S.C. § 1350,
jurisdiction therefore attached. In reviving the Alien Tort Statute, Filartiga stated:
"Indeed, for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become like the pirate and
slave trader before him-hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.,,70 The
common denominator of hostis humani generis seems to be the magnitude of the
threat posed by the acts, coupled with the universality of condemnation of the acts.
7'
63. See id. at 878.
64. See Simon, supra note 49, at 17 (construing the right to be free from torture as part of the customary
international law evidenced in the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights); see also Filartiga, 630 F.2d at
887 (stating that a violation of the Law of Nations is identical to a violation of customary international law),
65. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 867 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
66. SeeHarold Hongju Koh, TransnationalPublicLawLitigation, 100 YALEL.J. 2347,2366(1991) (stating
that in Filartiga, transnational public law litigants have found their equivalent to Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954)).
67. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 (stating that the act of torture committed by state officials violated
"established norms of international law of human rights, and hence the law of nations").
68. See Simon, supra note 49, at 18 (indicating that previously, plaintiffs had few, if any options for redress
since domestic courts almost never granted relief).
69. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884.
70. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890; see also Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 13, at 60 (indicating that the phrase
"hostis hunani generis" refers to a doctrine prominent in the late 18th and early 19th century Law of Nations); see
also United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144 (1820); see also United States v. Pirates, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)
184 (1820) (reciting that "certain acts specified as universally reprehensible would make the perpetrator liable to
capture and trial wherever he went. The principal, though by no means the only, application of hostis httmani
generis was to pirates").
71. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 13, at 60.
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The "transitory tort doctrine,' '72 as well as the U.S. Constitution,73 strengthened the
Filartiga court's finding of torture as a violation of the Law of Nations.
Further policy supporting another precedent Filartiga set was including torture
as a violation of the Law of Nations. The court held that the Alien Tort Statute
should not be interpreted according to its original meaning in 1789, but rather as an
evolving statute with broadening legal significance. 4 Thus, Judge Kaufman, by
defining torture as a violation of the Law of Nations, acknowledged that torture was
a universally recognized crime. 5
An additional legal principle underlying Filartiga is the finding that customary
international law is a matter of universal jurisdiction, such that any national court
may hear extra-territorial claims brought under international law. 6 In the United
States, the Alien Tort Statute constitutes a jurisdictional grant allowing U.S. district
courts to hear such claims." Finally, a defendant accused of using torture under the
color of state authority may not always use the affirmative defenses usually
available to sovereigns and their agents. 8 The defendants in Filartiga were accused
of violating international law, which generally requires a state actor, however the act
of state defense 79 was not available to them because their actions were ultra vires in
violation of the laws of their own country.80
72. See generally Slater v. Mexican National Railroad Co., 194 U.S. 120 (1904); see also Blum &
Steinhardt, supra note 13, at 63 (stating that according to the transitory tort doctrine, "civil actions for personal
injury torts are transitory in that the tortfeasor's wrongful acts create an obligation which follows him across
national boundaries"); see also Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885.
73. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (stating that "Congress shall have the power to define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations").
74. See 1 W.LiAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 263-64 (1769) (indicating that the Law of Nations was
included and recognized as part of the common law on both sides of the Atlantic in the 1700s).
75. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890 (stating that "[tihe international community has come to recognize the
common danger posed by the flagrant disregard of basic human rights and particularly the right to be free of
torture").
76. See Jordan J. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for
Foreign Violators of International Law Under the FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191, 211
(1983) (stating that "universal jurisdiction provides for jurisdiction to enforce sanctions against crimes that have
an independent basis in international law").
77. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885, 887-88.
78. See David F. KleinA Theoryfor the Application of the Customary International Law of Human Rights
by Domestic Courts, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 332, 342-43 (1988) (indicating that such a defendant is likely to have any
act of state or sovereign immunity defense stripped because sovereign nations are reluctant to admit a state policy
of torture in open court).
79. See also infra notes 125-52 and accompanying text.
80. See Klein, supra note 78, at 343.
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C. Cutting Away atFilartiga: Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic
Only four years later, in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,8' the District of
Columbia Circuit Court further confused the issue. In three separate concurring
opinions, Senior Circuit Judge Robb and Circuit Judges Edwards and Bork could
seem to agree on only one thing - acts of international terrorism are not justiciable
in U.S. courts under the Alien Tort Statute.82 Judge Robb argued that the dismissal
of the plaintiffs' claims was proper because the claims implicated nonjusticiable
83political questions. Specifically, Robb said, "[i]nternational terrorism consists of
a web that the courts are not positioned to unweave."' He stated that judicial
involvement in foreign affairs would seriously impair the national need for a single
voice in international affairs and could become embarrassing to the other branches
of government.85
Judge Edwards' concurrence endorsed Filartiga's holding that the Alien Tort
Statute provides a right to sue for an alleged violation of the Law of Nations.
8 6
Under his view, the Statute acts as a transformational device, injecting international
principles into domestic tort law and creating a private cause of action that may not
have existed independently under international law.87 However, Judge Edwards
believed that international law applied only to acts committed by a "state," and since
the defendants in Tel-Oren, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), was not
recognized as a state, the violations by the PLO of the Law of Nations were not
actionable.8 s
Finally, Judge Bork also denied jurisdiction over the Tel-Oren defendants, but
his logic differed vastly from his colleagues. 89 Essentially, Bork felt that the Alien
Tort Statute was obsolete.90 He believed that if the statute applied at all, it should be
strictly construed within the limited causes of action that were justiciable in 1789,9'
81. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam), cert. denied,470 U.S. 1003 (1985). Plaintiffs were survivors
and representatives of persons murdered in an armed attack on a civilian bus in Israel. See id. at 776. (Edwards, J.,
concurring). The perpetrators, members of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), seized an Israeli civilian
bus and several other vehicles. See id. at 775. The guerrillas took the occupants hostage and tortured them,
murdering 34 people and wounding 87 others. See id. The plaintiffs brought suit against the PLO, maintaining that
the PLO's tortious actions violated the Law of Nations. See id.
82. See id. at 775.
83. See id. at 824-25 (Robb, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 823.
85. See id. at 824, 826.
86. See id. at 777 (Edwards, J., concurring).
87. See Klein, supra note 78, at 343.
88. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791-92 (Edwards, J., concurring).
89. See id. at 799 (Bork, J., concurring).
90. See id. at 815.
91. See id. at 813 (stating that "[aiccording to Blackstone. . . 'the principal offences against the law of
nations, animadverted on as such by the municipal laws of England, [were] of three kinds: 1. Violation of safe-
conducts; 2. Infringement of the rights of embassadors; and 3. Piracy.').
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and that exercising jurisdiction in Filartiga-type actions contravened the framers'
intentions .
92
Although the Filartiga decision signaled a new frontier for judicial review of
international human rights violations, Tel-Oren placed the Statute's function as a
watchdog of international human rights in jeopardy.93 However, since Tel-Oren, the
Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal have held that a tort in violation of
international law is actionable under the Alien Tort Statute.94 In fact, both courts
rejected Judge Bork's and Judge Robb's positions and held that the statute (1) does
state a cause of action because there is a private right to sue,95 (2) is not confined to
the Law of Nations as it was in 1789,96 and (3) did not invoke the political question
doctrine.
97
In In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, Human Rights Litigation," the Ninth
Circuit held that official torture violated the Law of Nations under the Alien Tort
Statute and thereby conferred subject matter jurisdiction on the district court.99 On
August 31, 1977, Archimedes Trajano attended an open discussion meeting in the
Philippines where the defendant, Imee Marcos-Monotoc, daughter of former
Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos, was speaking.1°° During the meeting,
Trajano questioned Marcos-Monotoc's appointment as National Chairman of the
Kabataang Baranggay, a position within the Philippine government.1 1 After the
meeting, members of the Philippine intelligence kidnapped Trajano and tortured him
to death. 02 Marcos-Monotoc knew of the torture and where Trajano was taken.103
In February 1986, Trajano's mother filed suit against Marcos-Monotoc in the
U.S. District Court in Hawaii, where Marcos-Monotoc and her father fled after his
92. See id. at 821 (Bork, J., concurring).
For a young, weak nation, one anxious to avoid foreign entanglements and embroilment in
Europe's disputes, to undertake casually and without debate to regulate the conduct of other nations and
individuals abroad, conduct without an effect upon the interests of the United States, would be a piece
of breathtaking folly-so breathtaking as to render incredible any reading of the statute that produces such
results.
Id.
93. Debra A. Harvey, Comment, The Alien Tort Statute: International Human Rights Watchdog or Simply
'Historical Trivia'?, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 341, 351 (1988).
94. See In re Estate of Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 508 U.S. 972 (1993); Abebe-Jira
v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (1 lth Cir. 1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 830 (1996).
95. See Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 847.
96. See Marcos, 978 F.2d at 499.
97. See Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 848.
98. 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992).
99. See id. at 499, 501.
100. See id. at 495.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 496.
103. See id.
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removal from power.t°4 In 1994, ajury awarded plaintiffs $1.2 billion in damages.10 5
Later, the Eleventh Circuit in Abebe-Jira v. Negewo' 6 upheld a district court's
finding that an Ethiopian defendant was liable under the Alien Tort Statute for acts
of torture committed while he worked for the military dictatorship in Ethiopia." 7 For
the first time since Filartiga revived the Alien Tort Statute, there was a real
possibility that victims of human rights abuse would be compensated by their
tormentors with real dollars. 1
08
D. A Major Step in Human Rights Litigation: Kadic v. Karadzic
Perhaps the most significant post-Filartiga decision is the Second Circuit
Court's ruling in Kadic v. Karadzic.19 Kadic involved two actions brought by
plaintiffs, S. Kadic and Jane Doe, on behalf of themselves and others who alleged
they were victims of atrocious human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia,
against Radovan Karadzic, the former Bosnian Serb wartime leader."0 It was alleged
that these atrocities committed by ultra-nationalist soldiers included "genocide, rape,
forced prostitution and impregnation, torture and other cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment, assault and battery, sex and ethnic inequality, summary
execution, and wrongful death.""' The district court interpreted Filartiga and Tel-
104. See id. at 496 (describing that the plaintiff alleged emotional distress, false imprisonment, kidnapping,
and wrongful death on behalf of her son's estate).
105. See In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1469 (1994).
106. 72 .3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 96 (1996).
107. See id. at 848. In the 1970s, a military dictatorship known as "the Dergue" ruled Ethiopia and employed
a campaign of torture, arbitrary imprisonment, and summary execution against perceived enemies of the
government. See id. at 845. A terror campaign, called "the Red Terror," was carried out at local levels. See id. The
defendant, Kelbessa Negewo, served as the chairman of one of twenty-five governing units during the 1970s. See
id. The three female plaintiffs were arrested without charges being filed and held for weeks. See id. One plaintiff,
Hirute Abebe-Jira, was ordered to undress, tied up, and then whipped with a wire across her back while being
threatened with death. See id. Another plaintiff, Edgegayehu Taye, was stripped naked, tied up, and hung from a
pole. See id. After beating Taye severely, water was intentionally poured over her wounds to increase the pain. See
id. The third plaintiff, Elizabeth Demissie, was arrested with her family. See id. The same type of torture was
inflicted upon her. See id. However, when Elizabeth was returned to her cell, guards took her sister Haimanot from
the cell, and her family has not seen nor heard from her since. See id. at 845-46.
108. See Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 at 503.
109. 70 F.3d 232 (2nd Cir. 1995).
110. See id. at 236-37; see also William Aceves, Affirming the Law of Nations in U.S. Courts: The Karadzic
Litigation and the Yugoslav Conflict, 14 BERK. J. INT'L LAw 137,140-48 (1996) (giving an extensive history of the
Balkans and detailing how the recent Yugoslav crises can be traced to the Battle of Kosovo in 1389). In 1995,
leaders ofBosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Yugoslavia negotiated an end to the Yugoslav conflict. See id. at 147-
48. The agreement established a single Bosnian state composed of two entities: (1) the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which controlled 51% of the territory; and (2) the Republika Srpska, which controlled the remaining
49%. See id. at 148. Between the beginning of hostilities in 1991 and the signing of the General Framework
Agreement in December 1995, over 200,000 people, comprised mostly ofcivilians, died and millions more became
refugees. See id. at 141, 148.
111. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 237. The court later referred to several international authorities while concluding that
genocide is a violation of the Law of Nations, including The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide. 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (Jan. 12, 1951). The Treaty described genocide as an "odious scourge from
220
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Oren as holding that the Law of Nations could not be violated by a non-state actor
and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint since neither the Bosnian-Serb military
faction nor Karadzic's self-proclaimed nation of Srpska was a recognized state.'
In reversing the district court's dismissal, the Second Circuit added more depth
to the Alien Tort Statute by explaining that the Law of Nations, as understood in the
modem era, is not confined to state action. Therefore, private individuals as well as
state actors can violate international law.1 3 The appellate court held that with
respect to the torts of genocide and war crimes, both state and non-state actors can
be held responsible for violating customary international law."4 Chief Judge Jon
Newman distinguished the earlier holding in Tel-Oren by analyzing whether or not
an entity constitutes a "state for purposes of international law" under the standards
set forth in the Restatement of Foreign Relations. 15 By applying the Restatement
standard, the appellate court concluded that statehood does not require formal
recognition by another state 
16
Oddly, the appellate court also found that with respect to torture, there was
ample authority stating that liability may only be imposed on state actors' 1 7 Both
the 1991 Torture Victim Protection Act1 8 and Filartiga require that a torturer be a
state actor for liability to attach.19 Further, although the appellate court determined
that private individuals could violate the Law of Nations, the question of whether
the Law of Nations gave private individuals substantive rights to redress violations
which mankind must be liberated." 78 U.N.T.S. at 278. It specifically states that "persons committing
genocide... shall be punished whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private
individuals." Id. at 280.
112. See Kadic, 70 F3d at 237-38.
113. See id. at 239. The court opened its opinion by stating that, "most Americans would probably be
surprised to learn that victims of atrocities committed in Bosnia are suing the leader of the insurgent Bosnian-Serb
forces in a U.S. District Court in Manhattan." Id. at 236.
114. See id. at 239-41; see also Theodore R. Posner, International Decision: Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 E3d 232,
cert. denied, 64 U.S.LW. 3832 (June 18, 1996), 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 658, 663 (1996) (stating that "[tihe Second
Circuit's decision in Kadic may become an important precedent in the effort to remedy the human rights violations
that are likely to arise in the future").
In finding that genocide and war crimes are violations of international law capable of being committed
by non-state actors, the court has taken a significant step in advancing contemporary human rights
discourse, and may spur other governments to expand the list of atrocities that should be universally
condemned, regardless of the perpetrator.
Id.
115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (1987) (stating
that "[u]nder international law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent population, under the
control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such
entities").
116. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239 (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820), as an early
example of the application of the Law of Nations to the acts of private individuals, specifically the prohibition
against piracy).
117. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243-44.
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993); see infra notes 192-210 and accompanying text.
119. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244-45.
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was not addressed.120 Nevertheless, the significance of Kadic is its holding that in
certain circumstances, non-state actors could be international law violators, and that
the existence of a state in international law does not depend on official
recognition.
12 1
In the end, a federal jury ordered Karadzic to pay $4.5 billion in damages to the
victims, the largest amount ever awarded from litigation arising under the Alien Tort
Statute.122 In an eerie letter to U.S. District Judge Peter K. Leisure in 1997, Karadzic
exemplified and illustrated the futility of the Alien Tort Statute as he questioned the
court's right to sit in judgment of him. 23 "Can you really hope to find truth, or do
justice, or to protect rights of people in distant nations?" Karadzic asked, "Do you
really believe that attaching a U.S. dollar sign to human tragedy around the world
by empty judgments in uncontested lawsuits is a step towards peace or justice?"'
' 24
As unfortunate as the truth may be, this mass-murderer correctly pointed out the
weaknesses of relying on this symbolic law and the difficulty of taking a claim
under the Alien Tort Statute to fruition.
IV. PROBLEMS IN ESTABLISHING A SUCCESSFUL LAWSUIT UNDER
THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
Bringing a lawsuit alleging a violation of the Law of Nations under the Alien
Tort Statute is no small task. There are numerous hurdles that can prevent a court
from even reaching the merits of a case, let alone ruling in favor of a plaintiff.
Judicial doctrines such as the act of state and political question doctrines limit a
foreign plaintiff's accessibility to U.S. courts. Additionally, legislation severely
narrowed the specific type of defendant that can be sued. Even assuming that all
other barriers are overcome, the impossibility of collecting a judgment defeats the
practical purpose of the law.
120. See David P. Kunstle, Comment, Kadic v. Karadzic: Do Private Individuals Have Enforceable Rights
And Obligations Under TheAlien Tort Claims Act?, 6 DtKE J. CoMP. & INT'LL. 319,330-31 (1996) (stating that
no part of the court's opinion addresses whether Kadic and Doe could, as private individuals, bring claims under
the Alien Tort Statute based on a violation of the Law of Nations). Instead, the court discusses the Statute's Law
of Nations clause solely as a jurisdictional requirement. See id.
121. See Kadic, 70 F3d at 245. The court applied the Filartiga principle in Kadic stating that customary
international law defines not only what substantive standards bind the international community, but also who can
be bound by such standards. See id. at 241; see also Honorable John M. Walker, Jr., Domestic Adjudication of
International Human Rights Violations Under the Alien Tort Statute, 41 ST. Louis L.J. 539, 550 (1997) (Judge
Walker was a member of the Second Circuit panel which was assigned the appeal of the Kadic case).
122. See David Rhode, Jury in New York Orders Bosnian Serb to Pay Billions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2000,
at A8. Although the jury awarded the huge sum of money to the plaintiffs, thejury foreman conceded in a statement
made in court that the amount would almost certainly go unpaid. See id. The verdict was added to a $745 million
verdict issued against Karadzic by another jury just weeks prior to the $4.5 billion award. See id.
123. See id.
124. Id.
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A. The Act of State Doctrine
In the past, defendants in actions brought under the Alien Tort Statute'25 raised
the act of state doctrine as a defense.1 26 The judicially created act of state doctrine
prohibits U.S. courts from reviewing the validity of public acts of a recognized
foreign sovereign that are carried out in the foreign territory. 127 In Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino,128 the Supreme Court suggested that there were circumstances
under which U.S. courts might adjudicate the validity of foreign acts of state. 29
However, the Court refused to create an "inflexible and all-encompassing rule."'
130
Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, indicated that while it is not required by the
text of the Constitution, the act of state doctrine "expresses the strong sense of the
Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign
acts of state may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals both for
itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the international sphere."' 131 In
short, the separation of powers doctrine and judicial incompetence are the primary
reasons why American courts should not adjudicate cases arising under international
law. 3 2 Justice Harlan also cautioned that "[t]o permit the validity of the acts of one
sovereign state to be reexamined and perhaps condemned by the courts of another
would very certainly 'imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex
the peace of nations.""
133
125. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 3d 232 (2d Cir.
1995).
126. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,400 (1964); see also Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc.
v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990) (stating that the act of state doctrine generally precludes
review by U.S. courts of official acts performed by foreign states); see also Siderman de Blake v. Republic of
Argentina, 965 F.2d 669, 717 (9th Cir. 1992) (indicating that the doctrine embodies the prudential concern that
judicial inquiry into the validity of a foreign nation's sovereign acts may interfere with Executive and Congressional
foreign policy efforts).
127. See Banco Nacional, 376 U.S. at 416.
128. 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (examining a claim that the Cuban government's confiscation of private property
violated international law).
129. See id. at 427 (stating that the act of state doctrine is of federal origin, and serves certain constitutional
and international interests, but is not compelled by them). The Court also stated that "[the act of state] doctrine was
not compelled by the inherent nature of sovereign authority,... or by some principle of international law." Il at
421.
130. Id. at 428. Justice Harlan wrote that the act of state doctrine does have "constitutional underpinnings,"
id. at 423, based on "the proper distribution of functions between the judicial and political branches of the
Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs," id. at 427-28.
131. Id. at 423. The classic statement of the act of state doctrine reads:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the
courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its
own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open
to be availed by sovereign powers as between themselves.
Id. at 416 (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250,252 (1897).
132. See Ko t, supra note 66, at 2362 (indicating that if the Court applied a comity rationale, it would have
declined to enforce a Cuban decree that violated international law).
133. Banco Nacional, 376 U.S. at 417-18 (quoting Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918)).
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Banco Nacional identified three factors to be balanced in an act of state analysis:
(1) the extent to which the international rule implicated by the claim has been
codified and embraced by the consensus of states, (2) whether a decision on the
merits would interfere with the executive functions in foreign relations, and (3)
whether the government whose act is challenged continues to exist.' 34 A more direct
indication, according to Banco Nacional, of whether a court should adjudicate a
dispute is to consider,
the greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular
area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to
render decisions regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the
application of an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the
sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national
interest or with international justice.
35
Plaintiffs seeking to enforce human rights under the Alien Tort Statute faced one
of two dilemmas: either an officer of the state committed the tortious deprivation of
rights an officer of the state in his official capacity, in which case, the suit is barred
by the act of state doctrine; or the state did not authorize the actions, in which case
no violation of international law occurred. 36 The Filartiga court remedied both
dilemmas. 37 Judge Kaufman suggested that the state's failure to ratify an official's
action would preclude its characterization as an act of state.
38
This interpretation moves away from the Supreme Court's decision in Alfred
Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba.t39 The Dunhill Court refused to apply the
act of state doctrine without a showing by defendants that "the conduct in question
was the public act of those with authority to exercise sovereign powers and was
entitled to respect in our courts."' 4° With respect to human rights claims, the Dunhill
134. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 13, at 107-08 (indicating that the court found that it was unable to
make a decision on the case because there was no consensus as to the international law regarding the expropriation
of alien property and because the case raised sensitive issues in U.S. foreign relations).
135. Banco Nacional, 376 U.S. at 428.
136. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 13, at 108.
137. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F2d 876, 889-90 (2d Cir. 1980).
We doubt whether action by a state official in violation of the constitution and laws of the Republic of
Paraguay, and wholly unratified by that nation's government, could properly be characterized as an act
of state. Paraguay's renunciation of torture as a legitimate instrument of state policy, however, does not




139. 425 U.S. 682 (1976); see also Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 13, at 109-10 n.238 (indicating that the
Dunhill suit was brought against the Republic of Cuba for its failure to return funds mistakenly paid to a Cuban
state-controlled cigar manufacturer for cigars that never sold to the petitioner). Cuba defended by claiming the act
of state doctrine precluded a U.S. court from deciding the legality of the refusal to return the funds. Id.
140. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 694.
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requirement of state authorization forces the distinction between unauthorized acts
of individual officers from official acts of state. Therefore, abstention based on the
act of state doctrine cannot be triggered by conduct which is not ratified by the
state. 141 Under Dunhill, individual defendants, who can not prove that their conduct
was governmentally sanctioned or within the scope of their duties are unable to
invoke the act of state defense.42
The court in Kadic also examined whether the act of state doctrine barred
adjudication.1 43 The court stated that while the act of state doctrine might be
applicable to some cases brought under the Alien Tort Statute, it doubted "that the
acts of even a state official, taken in violation of a nation's fundamental law and
wholly unratified by that nation's government, could properly be characterized as
an act of state."' 44 However, the court also noted that the act of state doctrine has
previously applied in cases that lacked unambiguous agreements regarding
controlling legal principles. 45 The Kadic court found that there is a universal
agreement regarding the legal principles underlying international human rights. 1
46
One final consideration that must be addressed in any international human rights
case before a U.S. court is the potential for conflict between judicial authority and
political objectives. The traditional dominance of the U.S. President in the conduct
of U.S. international relations often compels courts to avoid any pronouncement on
the behavior of foreign nations that may conflict with U.S. policy toward these
countries.' 47 The political fallout the United States may face as a result of judicial
intervention is perhaps the most troublesome factor facing an action under the Alien
Tort Statute. 148 Strict adherence to the Banco Nacional test might necessitate judicial
abstention in a majority of human rights cases because an alien's human rights
claims often touch national political nerves.149 The Executive's concern with
international human rights combined with the judiciary's difficulty in gauging the
international ramifications of human rights litigation only adds to the potential
political fallout a plaintiff may face.150 The inescapable problem is that enforcing
141. See id. at 684.
142. SeeBum& Steinhardt, supra note 13, at 110 (indicating the authors'beliefthatbecause the foreign state
whose nationals or agents are sued for human rights violations may be unwilling to claim responsibility of the
challenged conduct in a public forum, it is more likely that the act of state doctrine is not a hurdle for plaintiffs
bringing an Alien Tort Statute lawsuit).
143. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
144. Id. at 250.
145. See id.
146. See supra notes 109-24 and accompanying text; see also Aceves, supra note 110, at 166.
147. See Michael C. Small, Comment, Enforcing International Human Rights Law in Federal Courts: The
Alien Tort Statute and the Separation of Powers, 74 GEO. L.J. 163, 183 (1985).
148. See id. at 188.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 188-89 (indicating that while there are many considerations that must be weighed, the plain
language of theAlien Tort Statute inherently moves thefederal court system into the political domain, becausecases
brought under the Statute raise issues traditionally left to political branches). The authorcites Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969) as a case that emphasized that conflict with another branch of the government cannot
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international human fights in U.S. courts may offend the governments whose
officials are accused of torture or other human rights violations.'' Thus, rather than
risk aggravating political tension, a court should use the act of state doctrine in
section 1350 human fights cases.1
52
B. The Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine is "founded primarily on the policies of
separation of power and judicial self-restraint," and essentially maintains that some
issues are too difficult for judicial resolution, even though they involve actual
controversies. 53 In adhering to this doctrine, courts must abstain from deciding
political questions and instead allow other branches of government to resolve
them. 154 Relying on the factors set forth in Baker v. Carr,155 the seminal case on the
political question doctrine, U.S. courts have found that some human rights cases
raise nonjusticiable political questions. 56 The difficult task facing a court is
balancing its statutory responsibilities against possible adverse impacts on U.S.
foreign policy 57 The doctrine is relatively simple to apply to human rights cases,
as the judge need only make vague reference to the political nature of a human
rights case and the interference with the President's human rights policies. 58 For
example, Judge Robb's concurrence in Tel-Oren invoked the political question
doctrine to dismiss the plaintiffs claims and questioned why courts should involve
justify the Court's avoidance of its constitutional responsibility. Id.
151. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 13, at 103.
152. See id.
153. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs 75 (1983).
154. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803); see also Wright, supra note 153, at 75
(indicating that the political question doctrine dates back to Marbury).
155. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In Baker, Justice Brennan listed seven tenets that are "prominent on the surface
of any case held to involve a political question." Id. at 217. Brennan listed the following factors, any of which may
involve a nonjusticiable political question:
A textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.
Id.
156. See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 598, 601 (D.D.C. 1983) (holding that the adjudication
of a claim against President Reagan regarding CIA funding of Nicaraguan rebels would demand an inappropriate
investigation into the U.S. involvement in Central America); see also Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461,466 (D.C.
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 931 (1973) (determining that questions about U.S. compliance with the
international community's economic boycott of Rhodesia is not appropriate for judicial resolution).
157. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 13, at 103.
158. See Small, supra note 147, at 187.
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themselves in such difficult subjects. 59 Judge Robb's approach reflects the opinion
held by many courts that the courtroom is no place to remedy either terrorist actions
or any other international human rights claim.
1 60
The political question doctrine requires the extensive exercise of judicial
discretion.1 61 The case may just be "too political... to handle."' 62 While courts
recognize that disputes involving foreign policy may potentially raise political
questions, the U.S. Supreme Court, through Justice White, stated, "it is error to
suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond
judicial cognizance."' 163 Instead, courts must focus on ascertaining the center of the
dispute; not simply asking about the existence of an individual interest, but instead
asking "how that individual interest fares against the international political interests
of the contending states.'t64
C. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has been said to stem from the ancient
maxim rex non potest peccare, meaning "the king can do no wrong."'165 In 1976,
Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 66 The Act departed from
the historical notion that foreign countries were protected by "an absolute wall of
159. See Tel-Oren v. Arab Republic, 726 E2d 774, 823-27 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (Robb, J.,
concurring).
160. See id. at 827.
161. See Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.. 2277,
2305 (1991).
162. Id.
163. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221,229-30 (1986).
164. Brilmayer, supra note 161, at 2305.
165. WilliamR. Dorsey, Reflections on the Foreign Sovereign ImmunitiesAct After Tiventy Years, 28 J. MAR.
L. & COM. 257, 257 (1997) (pointing out that in modem times it is generally agreed that either based on comity or
binding the international community to customary international law, the doctrine is to avoid friction in international
relations). See, e.g., Sompong Sucharitkul, Jurisdictional Innunities of States and TheirProperty, 1982 Y.B.INT'L
L. COMM'N, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 199 (1984) (indicating that foreign sovereign immunity is based on the maxim par in
parent, imperium non habet). This translates as "an equal has no dominion over an equal." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1267 (4th ed. 1951). The earliest U.S. decision recognizing sovereign immunity is Schooner Exchange
v. M'Faddon, 11 I.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). The case involved the takeover of a vessel of Napoleon's navy by two
U.S. citizens who claimed that the French wrongfully took the vessel from them. Id. The executive branch suggested
immunity and that the vessel be released. Id. Chief Justice John Marshall wrote the Court's opinion that upheld the
request for immunity, stating that the law and practice of nations supported the recognition of immunity. Id. at 53;
see also Berizzi Brothers Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926) (extending the doctrine of sovereign
immunity to commercial vessels operated by a foreign state); see also Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578
(1943) (holding that U.S. courts automatically defer to suggestions of immunity from the executive branch). It was
not until 1952 that the State Department formally announced that the doctrine of sovereign immunity would be
reduced to a more restrictive theory of immunity, extending only to cases that fell outside of private or commercial
activities. See Dorsey, supra, at 259.
• 166. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441, 1602-11 (1988).
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immunity." 167 The Supreme Court characterized immunity as "a matter of grace and
comity on the part of the United States, and not a restriction imposed by the
Constitution."'
' 68
There are three general objectives of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
69
Primarily, the Act codifies the principle of restrictive sovereign immunity.'70
Second, the issue of sovereign immunity was placed into the hands of the judiciary
and taken out of the hands of the Department of State to ensure the restrictive
principle of sovereign immunity was applied in litigation before U.S. courts. 17 1
Finally, the Act established a statutory procedure to procure service of process and
to obtain personal jurisdiction over a foreign state.'
Unfortunately for human rights attorneys, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. 73 severely curtailed the use of
the Alien Tort Statute as a human rights tool. In Amerada Hess, Argentine armed
forces attacked a Liberian oil tanker, The Hercules, during the Falkland Islands War
in violation of international law174 Amerada Hess chartered The Hercules, owned
by United Carriers, Inc., a Liberian corporation, to carry crude oil from Valdez,
Alaska, around the southern tip of South America, to Amerada's refinery in the U.S.
167. Walker, supra note 121, at 552 (explaining that the law codified certain exceptions of immunity based
on case law). Section 1605(a) lists seven immunity exceptions when a foreign state shall not be immune from the
jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case-
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication,
notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state may purport to effect except in
accordance with the terms of the waiver;
(2) in which the action is based on a commercial activity carried on in the United States by a
foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity
of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with
a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United
States ....
(5) ... in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or
for damage or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act of a foreign
state or of any official or employee of that foreign state which acting within the scope of his office or
employment....
(7) ... in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that
was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking.... if such act
were committed by an official of such foreign state while acting within the scope of their office.
Id. Additionally, section 1605(f) states that "No action shall be maintained under subsection (a)(7) unless the action
is commenced not later than ten years after the date on which the cause of action arose .... 28 U.S.C. § 1605(f).
168. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480,486 (1993).
169. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7-8 (1976); see also Dorsey, supra note 165, at 261.
170. Dorsey, supra note 165, at 261.
171. See id.; see also Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 623 F. Supp. 246, 251 (D.D.C. 1985) (stating that Congress
passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to remove the executive branch from the process of determining
sovereign immunity).
172. See Dorsey, supra note 165, at 261 (intimating that Congress intended the law to preempt any other
federal or state law granting immunity to foreign states and become the sole basis for resolution of these problems
brought in both federal and state courts).
173. 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
174. See id. at431.
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Virgin Islands.175 Argentine military aircraft with air-to-surface rockets attacked The
Hercules without provocation. 76 The ship was severely damaged but not destroyed,
and was eventually scuttled off the coast of Brazil after it was deemed too dangerous
to remove an undetonated bomb from her side. 177 Amerada Hess and United Carriers
filed suit against Argentina in the U.S. District Court in New York for nearly twelve
million dollars, basing jurisdiction on the Alien Tort Statute. 178 After the District
Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matterjurisdiction, and the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed after finding there was sufficient jurisdiction
under the Alien Tort Statute, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 79
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, determining that the Alien Tort
Statute did not vest federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction over foreign
sovereigns, and that the sole basis for obtaining such jurisdiction was under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 80 Professor David Bederman painted a grim
picture for plaintiffs in human rights cases by saying, "human rights advocates have
been dealt a lousy hand by Amerada Hess and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act."'18 He argued that "if an action is brought against a foreign sovereign, the Act
is triggered immediately; if brought against an individual, there is a substantial risk
that the defendant could persuade the court that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act applies only to her [or his] official conduct."'
82
Following the Amerada Hess decision, plaintiffs tried to argue that a waiver of
immunity occurs when a foreign sovereign acts in violation of international law.
However, the two circuits that considered the novel argument rejected it.183 First, in
Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, the plaintiff, a Holocaust survivor who was
denied reparations from Germany, claimed that because he was a U.S. citizen during
the Holocaust, he was falsely imprisoned and subjected to intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 184 He argued that Germany impliedly waived its sovereign
175. Seeid. (indicating that the Hercules notified Argentina of its intention to pass though the South Atlantic
on neutral business, outside of the area Britain and Argentina declared a "war zone").
176. See id. at 432.
177. See id.
178. See id. (specifying that the plaintiffs also based jurisdiction on general admiralty and maritime law, 28
U.S.C. § 1333, as well as "the principle of universal jurisdiction, recognized in customary international law").
179. See id. at 433.
180. See id. at 443 (announcing that the Court found that none of the enumerated exceptions to the Act
applied to the particular facts of this case).
181. David J. Bederman, Problems of Proving International Human Rights Law in the U.S. Courts: Dead
Man's Hand: Reshuffling Foreign Sovereign Immunities in U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 255, 278 (1996) (arguing that even if the litigator can somehow maneuver around the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, there are due process standards to satisfy, and the possibility that a court could discard the case on
forum non conveniens grounds).
182. Id.
183. See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1173-74 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also Siderman
de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 718-19 (9th Cir. 1992).
184. See Princz, 26 F.3d at 1168.
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immunity by flagrantly violating principles of international law. 85 The District of
Columbia Circuit held that even the most grievous human rights violations do not
demonstrate a foreign sovereign's intention to submit to suit in the United States,
thereby ending the debate over the use of the first immunity exception in section
1605.86 Another major setback for human rights litigants came from the Ninth
Circuit decision Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank.t87 There, the court clearly
stated that immunity is afforded to any individual acting in his or her official
capacity as an agent for the foreign state.1
88
At the very least, Amerada Hess and the other circuit court decisions on foreign
sovereign immunity seem to have limited the application of the Alien Tort Statute
to suits involving state actors that act outside the scope of their authority.'89 The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act has been interpreted to mean that if a foreign
state's conduct does not fall within one of its enumerated exceptions, the sovereign
is immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.' 9° While some courts liberally
construed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to exclude violations of
international law, the Act does not, as Amerada Hess requires, expressly provide for
an exception to immunity for international law violations. This suggests that
Congress specifically intended to bar any suits against foreign nations and
individuals acting within their official capacity.'
19
D. The Torture Victim Protection Act
On March 16, 1992, President George Bush signed into law the Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991.192 The Torture Victim Protection Act is a reaction to the
confused analysis of the three D.C. Circuit judges in Tel-Oren'93 and the rising
concern thatjudges are more hesitant in allowing federal jurisdiction under the Alien
185. See id. at 1173.
186. See id. at 1174.
187. 912 E2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990).
188. See id. at 1099-102 (finding that there is "little practical difference between a suit against a state and a
suit against an individual acting in his official capacity"); cf In re Estate of Marcos, 978 F.2d 493,497-98 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied 508 U.S. 972 (1993) (positing that sovereign immunity does not protect an individual who is
acting outside the scope of his or her authority).
189. See Walker, supra note 121, at 553-54 (indicating that when a state actor is acting pursuant to explicit
national policy and acts within his official authority, a sovereign immunity defense is available).
190. See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993).
191. See Adam C. Belsky, et al., Implied Waiver Under the FISA: A Proposed Exception to lnltnto1ity for
Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law, 77 CAL. L. REV. 365, 396 (1989) (arguing that while
Congress' intent is somewhat unclear, there should be no immunity protection for agents acting outside their
sovereign capacity).
192. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
193. 726 E2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 14
Tort Statute. 194 During the hearings for the Torture Victim Protection Act, Congress
addressed Judge Bork's primary objection in Tel-Oren, that the Alien Tort Statute
created no explicit cause of action. In the Torture Victims Protection Act, Congress
explicitly granted a private right of action for aliens and U.S. citizens that were
victims of torture or extrajudicial killing at the hand of "an individual acting under
color of law of any foreign nation." 195 By clearly defining extrajudicial killing and
torture, 196 the Torture Victim Protection Act eliminates the need for judges to define
and apply principles of international law, to determine whether a particular right
achieved the status of customary international law, or to find a violation of the Law
of Nations when issues of international practices of human rights are involved. 97
The Congressional hearing also clarified Judge Bork's concerns about construing
the legislative intent of the drafters of the Alien Tort Statute.'98
194. See Kathryn L. Pryor, Comment, Does the Torture Victim Protection Act Signal the Imminent Demise
oftheAlien Tort ClaimsAct?, 29 VA. J.INT'LL. 969, 1011 (1989); see also Matthew H. Murray, The Torture Victim
Protection Act: Legislation to Promote Enforcement of the Human Rights ofAliens in U.S. Courts, 25 COLuM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 673, 676 (1987). Even though valid arguments can be made to counter Judge Bork's theory that
a cause of action must be found outside the Alien Tort Statute itself, the arguments,
[d]o not address the essence of the problem raised by Tel-Oren, namely, that without a clear
congressional mandate, judges will not assume jurisdiction over the human rights of aliens [but will
interpret the statute] cautiously to avoid usurping legislative and executive functions and offending
foreign nations. The Alien Tort Statute will be an unreliable source of access to U.S. courts for alien
victims of human rights.
Id.
195. Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350(2)(a) (1993). Section 1350(2)(a) provides in pertinent
part:
An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation-subjects
an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual; or subjects an
individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to the individual's legal
representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death.
Id.
196. See id. § 1350(3)(a)-(b). Section 1350(3)(a) of the Torture Victim Protection Act defines extrajudicial
killings as "a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. ... Id.
§ 1350(3)(a). Section 1350(3)(b) defines torture as:
any act, directed against an individual in the offender's custody or physical control, by which severe
pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering arising only from or inherent in, or incidental to, lawful
sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that individual for such purposes as
obtaining from that individual or a third person information or a confession, punishing that individual
for an act that individual or a third person has committed, or is suspected of having committed,
intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of
any kind....
Id. § 1350(3)(b).
197. See Murray, supra note 194, at 696.
198. See The Torture Victim Protection Act: Hearing and Markup on H.R. 1417Before the Comm. on Foreign
Affairs and its Subcomm. on Human Rights and International Organizations of the House ofRepresentatives, 100th
Cong. 86,88 n. 1 (1988) (statement by Alice Henkin, Chair, Committee on International Human Rights, Association
of the Bar of the City of New York).
[Tlhe [Alien Tort Statute] does not speak specifically about torture and extrajudicial killing. It speaks
about a tort committed in violation of the law of nations. It is hard to know what the legislators had in
mind in 1789... and the problems that result from interpreting that language have caused some of the
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One notable distinction between the Torture Victim Protection Act and the Alien
Tort Statute is that the Torture Victim Protection Act is more restricted to the torts
of torture and extrajudicial killing while the less precise terms of the Alien Tort
Statute allow suits for torts that violate the Law of Nations.'" Another distinction
is that the Torture Victim Protection Act is limited to individual defendants who act
"under color of law of any foreign nation ''2°° while the Alien Tort Statute does not
specify a class of defendants. 201 A final distinction between the two statutes is that
the Torture Victim Protection Act, unlike the Alien Tort Statute, incorporates a
requirement that the claimant exhaust local remedies.2° Under this requirement,
plaintiffs are not allowed to bring suit unless no adequate domestic remedies are
available where the claim arose. 203
It is informative to look at the cases that successfully asserted jurisdiction under
the Alien Tort Statute to see if they would have been affected by the Torture Victim
Protection Act. It is generally accepted that the Torture Victim Protection Act was
intended to be a codification of the Filartiga case.204 Therefore, both the Alien Tort
confusion.... This act gets at those specific acts of torture and extrajudicial killing which are now
universally recognized as violations of the law of nations.
Id.; see also id. (statement by Michael H. Posner, Executive Director, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights)
This is really an effort to clarify, to make sure that every federal court in the United States understands
explicitly that acts of torture and extrajudicial killings can be remed[ied] in the United States, that there
is a private right of action. And that, the U.S. Congress, the 100th Congress has gone on record explicitly
in support of this kind ofjudicial relief.
Id.; see also id. at 72 (statement by Patricia Rengel, Codirector, Washington Office, Amnesty International USA)
[A]nytime that Congress expresses its intent, as it is doing here, to combat the practice of torture, it can
do nothing but strengthen existing law... I think the legislation clarifies, as it extends, and it codifies
in a way for the nation as a whole what were the intentions, I think, of those framers of Section 1350.
Id.
199. See Pryor, supra note 194, at 1016 (indicating that the Alien Tort Statute is much less constrained and
more open to a broader scope of international law violations).
200. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
201. See Pryor, supra note 194, at 1017 (noting that the Torture Victim Protection Act does not apply to
foreign state defendants, nor can the United States or any U.S. official be sued under the Torture Victim Protection
Act because it specifically refers only to those acting under authority of a foreign nation). Further, the "color of law"
aspect is the same as the requirement that the actor be a state official acting under state law asserted by Judge
Edwards in Tel-Oren. See id.
202. Torture Victim Protection Act § 2(b) states: "A court shall decline to hear a claim under this section if
the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available remedies in the place in which the conduct giving rise to the
claim occurred."
203. See Pryor, supra note 194, at 1017; see also Paula Rivka Schochet, A New Roleforan Old Rule: Local
Remedies and Expanding Human Rights Jurisdiction Under the Torture Victim Protection Act, 19 COLUM. HUM.
RTs. L. REv. 223,225 n.4 (1987) (indicating that when the plaintiffdoes not exhaust all local remedies, courts will
likely only decline jurisdiction if the defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that adequate and
available remedies are available locally).
204. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (indicating that the requirements of the Torture
Victim Protection Act and the facts of Filartiga are similar). For example, the Filartiga family attempted to exhaust
all available domestic remedies, but failed. Id. at 878. Also, the Filartigas accused a government official of
committing the prohibited action. Id.
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Statute and Torture Victim Protection Act would provide a remedy for the Filartiga
family.
205
Not all cases sustained under the Alien Tort Statute would survive the scrutiny
of the Torture Victim Protection Act indicating a possible conflict between the two
statutes. For example, Forti v. Suarez-Mason2 6 is significant for extending the
Filartiga analysis beyond torture to include prolonged arbitrary detention and
"causing disappearances." 2 7 Under the Torture Victim Protection Act, a court would
likely exclude these claims because they do not fall within the mere limited
definitions of the Act, indicating that for the assertion of human rights claims, access
to U.S. courts under the Torture Victim Protection Act is much more limited.2° The
Bush administration foresaw complications with the provisions of the Torture
Victim Protection Act, and President Bush noted that, "potential abuse of this statute
undoubtedly would give rise to serious frictions in international relations and would
also be a waste of our own limited and already overburdened judicial resources." 209
It appears that Congress intended torture and extrajudicial killing claims be brought
under the Torture Victim Protection Act, which would in effect repeal the Alien Tort
Statute, or at least make it inapplicable to torture and extrajudicial killings.2 0
E. Judgment Collection
The Filartiga judgment opened the door for other massive monetary
judgments2t' and new legislation.212 However, success in a U.S. court does not
205. See Murray, supra note 194, at 698 (explaining that the Torture Victim Protection Act essentially gives
congressional endorsement to the approach taken by the Filartiga court).
206. 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D.Cal.1987).
207. See id. at 1537 (stating that two Argentine citizens filed the complaint seeking damages from another
Argentine citizen, Suarez-Mason, for torture, murder, prolonged arbitrary detention, summary execution and
"causing disappearances" during Argentina's "dirty war' against suspected subversives, by police personnel, under
the authority of the defendant).
208. See Pryor, supra note 194, at 1022 (indicating that while the torture in Filartiga and the torture and
extrajudicial killings in Forti would probably be successful, the majority of claims would not be allowed under the
Torture Victim Protection Act).
209. 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 91 (statement by President GeorgeBush upon signing the Torture Victim
Protection Act).
210. See ChristopherW. Haffke, Comment, The Torture Victim ProtectionAct: More Symbol Than Substance,
43 EMoRY L.J. 1467, 1483 (1994) (arguing that by including the exhaustion of remedies requirement and a 10 year
statute of limitations, Congress intended that torture and extrajudicial killing claims be brought under the Torture
Victim Protection Act).
211. See, e.g., In re Estate of Marcos, 910 F. Supp. 1460 (D.C. Haw. 1995) (indicating that a class action suit
was brought on behalf of 10,000 victims under the regime of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines and resulted in
an award of nearly $2 billion); Paul v. Avril, 901 F Supp. 330 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (awarding $41 million to six
prominent citizens tortured under the direction of Haitian dictator Prosper Avril).
212. See supra notes 192-210 and accompanying text (explaining that the Torture Victim Protection Act was
indirectly bome from the Alien Tort Statute).
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necessarily lead to"'success in recovering a judgment. 23 The litigation alone is
extremely difficult, mainly because the accused is a high-ranking governmental
official who can easily return to his or her home country and hide assets.21 4 Further,
most plaintiffs in Alien Tort Statute claims require the assistance of non-profit legal
organizations, and the difficulty in collection hampers an organization's ability to
effectively continue representing clients at a reduced fee.21 5 Even when a defendant
is properly served, tried, and a judgment entered against him, the problem of
enforceability still exists.21 6 Successful collection evades all Alien Tort Statute
plaintiffs, making a courtroom victory only the "tip of the iceberg. 2 17 While the
Filartiga case provided significant insight, it has very little practical value.218
President George Bush stated at the signing of the Torture Victim Protection Act
that if the Act is abused, "U.S. courts could ... become embroiled in difficult and
sensitive disputes in other countries... which have nothing to do with the United
States and which offer little prospect of successful recovery."219 During oral
arguments given in the Filartiga case, one of the judges asked the following
question: "Because the defendant apparently does not have much money, what was
the point of this high-profile case, other than getting your name in the newspapers?"
Attorney Peter Weiss answered that,
[T]he point was to send a message that the United States is not a haven for
people like Pena-Irala. People who torture are not welcome here, and if they
come here, they will be pursued by their victims, who will use the full
arsenal of the U.S. judicial process to defend and to vindicate their rights.220
213. See George N. Stavis, Comment, Collecting Judgments in Human Rights Torts Cases-Flexibility for
Non-Profit Litigators?, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 209, 214 n.20 (1999) (indicating that the only cases with a
likely chance of recovery are the Marcos case and some of the Swiss Bank cases involving Jewish assets hidden
by banks after World War U).
214. See id.
215. See Edward A. Amley, Jr., Comment, Sue and Be Recognized: Collecting 1350 Judgments Abroad, 107
YALEL.J. 2177, 2178 (1998) (indicating that advocates cannot afford to ignore the "bottom line"). Generally, law
school clinics, non-governmental organizations, and private practitioners engaging in pro bono litigation are the
only legal representatives that are willing to assist Alien Tort Statute plaintiffs. See id.
216. See Charles F Marshall, Development in Immigration Law: Re-framing the Alien Tort Act After Kadic
v. Karadzic, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 591, 617 (1996) (indicating that Dolly and Joel Filartiga have not
recovered any monetary damages as a result of their 1980 judgment against Pena-Irala).
217. See Stavis, supra note 213, at 216 (indicating that with the possible exception of the Marcos case, all
collection efforts are ongoing).
218. See Marshall, supra note 216, at 617 (arguing that in the Kadic case, even though a massive judgment
has been rendered against Radovan Karadzic, it is extremely unlikely that he will ever surrender himself to U.S.
officials so that judgment can be enforced).
219. 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 91.
220. See Steven M. Schneebaum, Symposium on the Future of International Human Rights: Human Rights
in the United States Courts: The Role of Lawyers, 55 WASH & LEE L. REV. 737, 750 (1998).
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Even attempts to collect judgments in non-U.S. courts would be extremely difficult,
considering a multitude of legal as well as non-legal factors that are likely to
obstruct judgment recognition efforts. 1 ' As one commentator eloquently noted:
The difficulty of enforcing monetary judgments entered in almost all of
these [human rights] cases has hampered the expansion of this human rights
legal tool. Failure to collect judgments has both limited the legal resources
available to bring additional cases, and risked conveying the notion that
international torturers have little to fear from judgments in United States
courts.
22 2
V. How THE LI PENG PLAINTIFFS MIGHT FARE
In 1988, China's Communist Party Chairman and paramount leader, Deng
Xiaoping, hand-selected Li-Peng to act as China's Prime Minister.23 When pro-
democracy protests erupted in Communist China in April 1989, Deng and Li
differed in their opinions on how to deal with the thousands of student
demonstrators who were demanding their constitutional rights to freedom of
expression and assembly.224 Finally, on June 3, the Chinese government sent tanks
and armed soldiers into Tiananmen Square to end the protests. It is alleged that Li
was the man who ordered the crackdown.225 Although never released by the Chinese
government, the death toll is estimated to be in the thousands.226 The Chinese
government continues to insist that the protests were a counter-revolutionary
rebellion and therefore the crackdown was "highly necessary.
227
221. See Amley, supra note 215, at 2182-94 (explaining that concerns such as personal jurisdiction, subject
matter jurisdiction, public policy, choice of law, default judgments, and foreign sovereign immunity are likely to
affect a foreign court's desire to implement a U.S. decision against a national of that country).
222. Stavis, supra note 213, at 216.
223. Li Peng: The Great Survivor of Chinese Politics, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 22, 2000 (recounting
Li Peng's life in Chinese politics, including his training to become an engineer in Moscow's Power Institute, his
subsequent climb up the Communist Party hierarchy to reach the powerful Central Committee in 1982, and his
service as an education minister in 1985 before being selected to become Prime Minister). Additionally, Li's natural
father was an author who was executed for being a Communist sympathizer when Li was three years old. Id. Li was
thrust into politics at an early age when he became the foster son of Zhou Enlai, the future prime minister of
Communist Revolution leader Mao Zedong. Id.
224. See id. (adding that when Communist Party Secretary General Zhao Ziyang spoke with hunger-striking
demonstrators, he shed tears of compassion; in contrast, Li Peng sat stone-faced as student leader Wang Dan
lectured him on national television).
225. See Former Chinese Premier Ordered to Appear in U.S. Federal Court, supra note 1 (noting that many
human rights groups claim Li gave the order for the crackdown, including the Center for Constitutional Rights
which filed the lawsuit on behalf of the Chinese dissidents).
226. See Families of Tiananmen Victims Welcome Leaked Files, Seek Justice, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan.
9, 2001 (indicating that any efforts to commemorate students, workers, and others killed in the Massacre on its
anniversary are quickly and firmly suppressed).
227. See id.
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Based on the actions of Li Peng and the Chinese government, a lawsuit seeking
monetary damages and redress for China's actions was filed on behalf of five
student demonstrators against Li Peng.228 Plaintiffs alleged violations of both the
Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act.229 However, as previously
discussed, succeeding in such a lawsuit is a difficult task. The plaintiffs in this case
must be able to allege a violation of the Law of Nations for success under the Alien
Tort Statute, and show either torture or extrajudicial killing to sustain a lawsuit
under the Torture Victim Protection Act. In addition, the plaintiffs must overcome
the hurdles of the act of state doctrine, the political question doctrine, and the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act before they can even be given consideration of
the merits of their claims.
A. Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act
1. The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations
The Law of Nations is the cornerstone of the Alien Tort Statute because without
finding a violation of the Law of Nations, a potential lawsuit cannot go forward. The
Law of Nations as described by Blackstone is "a system of rules, deducible by
natural reason, and established by universal consent among the civilized inhabitants
of the world."230 However, the Law of Nations today is a reference to customary
international law. Therefore, the question is whether Li Peng violated the Law of
Nations, or more specifically, customary international human rights law, by issuing
the order to suppress the student demonstrators. Even if Li made the final decision
to send tanks and soldiers into the Square to stop a "revolutionary rebellion, ' 23' he
certainly would not be the first leader to attempt to subdue a revolution. Thus, it is
reasonable to infer that international law accepts government use of military force
to stop a revolution. However, the level of force employed by the Chinese army
seems disproportionate when compared to the nonviolent nature of the student's
232protests. Therefore, it is likely that Li's alleged conduct violated the Law of
Nations because he used clearly excessive force against unarmed, peaceful
protestors. This would allow Chinese dissidents to rely on the Alien Tort Statute to
present their claims in a U.S. court.
228. See Wong, supra note 1, at A6.
229. See id.
230. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 66 (1769).
231. See Families of Tiananmen Victims Welcome Leaked Files, Seek Justice, supra note 226.
232. See Former Chinese Premier Ordered to Appear in U.S. Federal Court, supra note 1 (indicating that
the People's Liberation Army and the People's Armed Police used semi-automatic weapons and armored cars on
students engaging in a hunger strike to demand their constitutional rights).
236
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2. The Torture Victim Protection Act
The Torture Victim Protection Act is not likely to provide Chinese dissidents
with an outlet into U.S. courts. Unlike the Alien Tort Statute, the Torture Victim
Protection Act explicitly confers a cause of action only for "torture or extrajudicial
killing."' 3 The plaintiffs face the uphill battle of proving that the Chinese
government's actions constituted either torture or extrajudicial killings.
a. Torture
The Torture Victim Protection Act describes torture as "any act, directed against
an individual in the offender's custody by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that individual.., for such purposes
as obtaining information or a confession .. ,"234
The Tiananmen Square incident did not involve the intentional infliction of pain
to detained civilians to obtain information. Martial law had been declared in Beijing,
and authorities fired upon the nearly one million peaceful protestors in order to clear
the Square.25 Although the Chinese government committed an atrocity, its actions
do not meet the statutory definition of torture.
b. Extrajudicial Killing
The plaintiffs will also likely find that their claim does not fit into the
parameters of the definition of extrajudicial killing. An extrajudicial killing is
defined as "a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced
by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.. ,2 6 Although a court of law did
not direct the actions taken by the Chinese government, they were nevertheless
undertaken in an effort to restore order to Beijing.
23 7
Additionally, the circumstances of the Massacre make it extremely difficult to
establish the requirements of an extrajudicial killing in a court of law. Thousands of
deaths resulted from the military's assault on the unarmed civilians. Military leaders
ordered Chinese soldiers to clear the protesters from the Square at all costs. These
orders indicate that the soldiers engaged in random shooting, rather than the directed
233. See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 3(a)-(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988).
234. See id. § 3(b); see also supra note 196 (defining torture and extrajudicial killing).
235. See Kristy Creel, Deng Dies at 92; Leaves Legacy of Contradictions THE AMERICAN OBSERVER, (Feb.
20, 1997), at http://observer.soc.american.edu/220kc.htm (on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
236. Torture Victim Protection Act § 3(a).
237. See Families of iananmen Wctims Welcome Leaked Files, Seek Justice, supra note 226.
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summary executions that the plaintiffs allege in their complaint. 2 8 Therefore,
because the Chinese government's actions do not constitute torture or extrajudicial
killing as defined under the Torture Victim Protection Act, the plaintiffs claims
under the Act will likely fail.
B. Possible Defenses to the Application of the Alien Tort Statute
1. The Act of State Doctrine
Assuming the court allows the plaintiffs to proceed on their causes of action
under the Alien Tort Statute, it is likely that Li Peng will present the act of state
doctrine as a defense. In essence, the act of state doctrine prevents U.S. courts from
reviewing the validity of public acts carried out by a recognized foreign sovereign
in its own territory.2 9 Considering the known facts of the Tiananmen Square
Massacre, it appears that Li Peng's actions as Prime Minister of China during the
conflict can be characterized as official acts of state, thus barring the case from
adjudication in the United States.
In Kadic, the court refused to characterize the brutal actions taken by Bosnian
Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and his troops as acts of state because they were
committed in violation of the nation's fundamental law and were unratified by the
nation's government.240 The Kadic court doubted "that the acts of even a state
official, taken in violation of a nation's fundamental law and wholly unratified by
that nation's government, could properly be characterized as an act of state."
24'
Here, while the acts that occurred were no less brutal, it was the Chinese
government that ordered the clearing of demonstrators from Tiananmen Square.
Further, Li Peng's actions did not clearly violate Chinese law because two weeks
prior to the Massacre, the Chinese government imposed martial law on Beijing.
2 42
Technically, the demonstrators violated the law by remaining in the Square while
Beijing was under martial law.243 Therefore, Li Peng's actions were ratified by the
238. See Former Chinese Premier Ordered to Appear in U.S. Federal Court, supra note 1; see also Torture
Victim Protection Act § 2(c) (indicating that "[N]o action shall be maintained under this section unless it is
commenced within ten years after the cause of action arose"). Since the Tiananmen Square Massacre occurred on
June 3, 1989, but plaintiffs did not file the complaint until August 30, 2000, the lawsuit falls outside the 10 year
statute of limitations set forth in the Act. The Alien Tort Statute has no statute of limitation.
239. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964).
240. Id.
241. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995).
242. See Creel, supra note 235.
243. Martial law is defined as:
The law by which during wartime the army, instead of civil authority, governs the country because of
a perceived need for military security or public safety. The military assumes control until civil authority
can be restored. Martial law is usually imposed when rules foresee an invasion, insurrection, economic
collapse, or other breakdown of the rulers' desired social order.
BLACK'S LAWDICTIONARY 988-89 (7th ed. 1999); see also Creel, supra note 235 (quoting Chairman Deng speaking
to officers enforcing the martial law after the Massacre, as questioning what right the United States has to blame
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Chinese government and operated upon under martial law. While certainly
appalling, they constitute an act of state, as specified by the rule stated in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,24 thus barring the court from proceeding on the
merits.
2. The Political Question Doctrine
A second defense Li Peng may raise is the application of the political question
doctrine. The doctrine is founded on policies favoring the separation of power and
judicial restraint, and maintains that some issues are too difficult for judicial
resolution.245 In accordance with this doctrine, courts must abstain from deciding
political questions and instead allow the other branches of government to resolve
them.246 Often times, courts simply declare that a case is so deeply rooted in foreign
policy that judicial resolution would interfere with the U.S. President's traditional
predominance in conducting international relations.247
If a U.S. court held Li Peng, the Chairman of China's People's Congress and the
second highest ranking official in China, personally liable in a lawsuit in the United
States, it could injure economic as well as diplomatic relations between China and
the United States. Chinese officials are infuriated that the United States feels it has
jurisdiction to sue a Chinese government official and denounce the suit as a
"political farce."248 If the lawsuit progresses, the potential for political conflict
between China and the United States is significant. A treaty that grants China "Most
Favored Nation" status and potentially equalizes trade is currently awaiting approval
in Congress. Holding Li Peng liable in the United States for his acts could
jeopardize this major step in United States-Chinese relations. 249
Therefore, as one commentator indicated, rather than risk political tension, a
court should use the political question doctrine to preclude the use of the Alien Tort
Statute in cases involving the Tiananmen Square massacre °50 In this particular case,
China for suppressing a counter-revolutionary rebellion, especially because the United States called out police to
suppress a student-led demonstration on the campus of Kent State University in 1968, in which four students were
shot dead).
244. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
245. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 75 (1983).
246. Id.
247. See Small, supra note 147, at 183.
248. See Araminta Wordsworth, China Demands U.S. Stop LawsuitAgainst Former Premier. Human Rights
Group Seeks Damages For 7iananmen Massacre, NAT'L POST, Sept. 6, 2000 at A15 (quoting Sun Yuxi, a
spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, "This is a political farce fabricated by a small handful of anti-China
elements in the United States out of despicable motives. China demands the U.S. abide by international principles
and take concrete measures to stop these people's mean activities").
249. See Permanent Normal Trade Relations for China Bill, Pub. L. No. 106-286, 114 Stat. 880 (2000)
(extending nondiscriminatory treatment to the People's Republic of China, and establishing a framework for
relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China).
250. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 13, at 103.
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the political ramifications alone necessitate that a judge abstain from ruling on the
merits of the plaintiffs' claims.
3. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
Finally, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act presents yet another defense for
Li Peng and another problem the Chinese dissidents must overcome. The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act defines a "foreign state" as including a "political
subdivision" or an "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign state,25' but does not
directly include head-of-state immunity. However, courts view the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act as including head-of-state immunity252 even though the
text of the statute is silent on the issue. Therefore, Li Peng, as one of China's head
officials, is able to use the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as a defense in this
case.
Several exceptions to the traditional grant of immunity to foreign sovereigns are
listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a). 3 However, none of the listed exceptions apply to this
case, thus entitling Li Peng to sovereign immunity. For example, the first section
1605(a) exception provides that a state actor is not immune from jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States when the foreign state waives its immunity either
explicitly or implicitly.254 In this case, China has made no such waiver. The
argument advanced by many plaintiffs faced with a sovereign immunity defense is
that actions such as torture or genocide implicitly waive a foreign sovereign's right
to immunity from U.S. courts. z5 However, in the case at hand, the Chinese
government officially condoned Li Peng's conduct, claiming it as necessary to
suppress what officials within the government considered a revolutionary revolt.
25 6
Therefore, China never made an official or implied waiver to withdraw the
immunity grant to Li Peng.
257
Section 1605(a)(7) retracts immunity from suits for money damages brought
against a foreign state when the official of the foreign state, acting within his/her
official duties, causes personal injury or death by an act of torture, extrajudicial
killing, aircraft sabotage, or hostage taking.258 However, because the definitions of
251. Id. § 1603(a).
252. See, e.g., Chuidian v. Philippine Natl. Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 1990); Junquist v. Nahyan,
115 F.3d 1020, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
253. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441, 1602-11 (1988).
254. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).
255. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir.
1995).
256. See Families of Tiananmen Victims Welcome Leaked Files, Seek Justice, supra note 226.
257. See Wordsworth, supra note 248, at A15; see also Former Chinese Premier Ordered to Appear it U.S.
Federal Court, supra note 1 (reporting that Li Peng went home in a rage after being served with process because
he believed that he was under the protection of United Nations while attending the United Nations Conference of
Presiding Officers of National Parliaments).
258. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (1988).
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torture and extrajudicial killings are identical to those in the Torture Victim
Protection Act, the plaintiff's claims fail here as well2 9
InArgentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court
announced that the sole basis for obtaining subject matterjurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign was under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.260 Because Li Peng's
alleged actions do not fall into one of the enumerated exceptions of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, and because the actions taken were officially sanctioned
by the Chinese government, Li should be entitled to immunity as a foreign
sovereign. Thus, he is not subject to jurisdiction in the United States for claims
arising from the Tiananmen Square Massacre.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the Tiananmen Square Massacre was certainly appalling, the current legal
remedies in the United States cannot provide the plaintiffs with the redress they
seek. Even if the students successfully articulate a cause of action under the Alien
Tort Statute, the court should refuse to hear the Li Peng matter.
The court has at least three arrows in its quiver. First, the act of state doctrine
bars the court from deciding the case because the Chinese government was acting
pursuant to martial law imposed upon Beijing. Second, due to the politically charged
atmosphere surrounding the case, the political question doctrine provides another
basis for judicial abstention. Finally, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Amerada Hess, clearly
declares that when a foreign state's conduct does not fall within one of the
enumerated exceptions, the sovereign is immune from the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts. For these reasons, the Alien Tort Statute cannot provide these plaintiffs the
reparations they desire and the court should dismiss the cause of action.
While the Alien Tort Statute is the foremost method to redress human rights
abuses, the law is so burdened with impediments that its application is nearly
impossible. The numerous judicial abstention doctrines, the statutory barriers, and
the general ambiguities of the Statute make the law inapplicable to a majority of
cases under which it is brought. Even assuming the lawsuit succeeds, the reality of
the Alien Tort Statute is that the plaintiffs will not receive a cent of the judgment.
The best a plaintiff can hope for is that a judge and jury agree that torture and other
human rights violations are wrong and should not be condoned. However, a
plaintiff's desire to hear those words or to have his or her story printed in
newspapers cannot justify the waste of scarce judicial resources. Without putting
some teeth behind the law, a majority of cases brought under the Alien Tort Statute
do not justify the use of the judicial system.
259. See id. § 1605(e)(1).
260. 488 U.S. 428,439 (1989).
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Prior judgments havd not curtailed human rights abuses. A U.S. judge is unable
to single-handedly rectify, stop, or even reduce human rights abuses by handing
down an empty and unenforceable judgment. Using the Alien Tort Statute for the
purpose of redressing human rights violations is certainly a noble one: to announce
to the world that the United States does not tolerate violations of the Law of
Nations, and is not a safe-haven for the world's torturers. However, it is impossible
to attach a dollar sign to human suffering, and attempting to do so in a lawsuit
unlikely to produce anything but newspaper headlines does not accomplish the goal
of ridding the world of torture and human rights abuses.
